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ABSTRACT 
This thesis was written to evaluate the relative importance of ethnic, economic, 
and military nationalism between China and Japan over a two-year period on the subject 
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute. From 2010 to 2012, this ongoing dispute 
generated a lot of open source media that delved into the issue, from published books to 
newspaper articles. What I found was the relative importance of economic over ethnic 
and military nationalism: the two countries fought to maintain economic stability above 
all else. This leads me to believe that despite these ongoing feuds, both countries realize 
that trade and maintaining other economic ties are far more important today than before. 
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The purpose of this research study is to evaluate the relative importance of each 
brand of nationalism—ethnic, economic, and military—as each applies to the conflicts that 
arose around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between 2010 to 2012 in China and Japan. The 
framework of my research centers on how each country used these three different kinds of 
nationalism and which of these was most important.  
My research and analysis focused entirely on published open-source documentation 
written in English. In addition to primary-source policy papers from government websites, 
I relied upon secondary sources including academic books, journals, newspapers, and 
economic data from reputable databases.  
Based on my findings throughout open-source documents, there was a gradual 
increase in the amount of violence and backlash over the islands. There was an increased 
reliance on military usage; however, both countries did back down from each other’s 
threats. China and Japan did what was necessary to maintain the status quo but did not 
intentionally escalate military tensions due to the need to maintain economic stability.  
One common theme we see in this dispute is postponement—in other words, 
solving the problem later in favor of economic benefit. Postponement does come with a 
price; it does not resolve the issue at hand. But in this case, I found that economic 
nationalism was far more important than ethnic or military nationalism. The former was 
the enabler of the latter two. Both countries are not willing to go to outright, militant war 
over these islands at the risk of losing the economic advantages they enjoy with each other 
and the rest of the world.  
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I. NATIONALISM LITERATURE REVIEW 
Nationalism in all its forms is a significant driver for most countries’ decisions. For 
Japan and China, ethnic, economic, and military nationalism are the most important types 
of nationalism as it relates to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. This is significant due to the 
historical memory of both countries and the economic resources at both countries’ disposal, 
as well as the recent publicity and attention the vessels in the vicinity have received. To 
better understand the nuances of the previously mentioned drivers—under the umbrella of 
nationalism—the best thing to do is to have a broad understanding of the almost family-
tree-like relationship of nationalism. Once that foundation is set, potential explanations and 
hypotheses make more sense. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH FOCUS 
The main goal of this thesis is to evaluate the relative importance of ethnic, 
economic, and military nationalism in Chinese and Japanese decisions regarding the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute from 2010 to 2012. I evaluate both China’s and Japan’s 
government decisions about the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute for the relative importance 
of three prominent types of nationalism: ethnic, economic, and military. The specific 
government decisions I evaluate include published policy, public knowledge, country-
specific directives regarding military forces, and economic decisions made by China and 
Japan toward each other. This thesis looks at documents written in English or translated to 
English from Japanese or Chinese since 2010. The framework of my research centers on 
specific decisions each country made and how, if at all, each was an instance of one or 
more of those three nationalist tendencies. 
B. RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
Historically, Japan and China have been at odds with each other and continual 
tensions will likely lead to dissimilar roles than in the past, as fortunes change. China 
continues to expand its reach via man-made islands in the East and South China Seas, while 
Japan slowly increases the size of its military. But both countries have an expansive 
economy to support further growth of their military. Both countries’ relationships seem 
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uneven. Japan has a seemingly mutually beneficial relationship with the United States 
(military protection in exchange for economic benefit) which allowed Japan to divert 
money that normally would have been reserved for military development was injected into 
the economy. China’s economy grew despite Japan’s advantage. It has only just started 
slowing, but that has allowed it to grow in other ways such as through military growth, 
global influence, or investment.  
As indicated by the large volume of scholarship, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute 
is still relevant to contemporary China and Japan. This thesis attempts to evaluate each 
country’s decision through the lens of nationalism about a territorial dispute that has not 
been resolved. This question is still relevant to contemporary China and Japan because of 
the higher factor nationalism plays in each country. Although the two countries have a long 
history of contention, debate and difference of opinion about the islands, my focus will 
remain on the contemporary. There will be a section of this thesis that covers a brief history 
of both countries’ actions regarding the islands.  
Based on the large body of existing scholarship, these two countries’ dispute is a 
prime example of conflict over territory. This conflict over territory brings to bear all three 
types of nationalism. This thesis attempts to parse out the relative importance of each type 
of nationalism as it relates to political decisions about the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Not 
only does this dispute between China and Japan encompass regional or identity boundaries, 
but also tests their military. This dispute tests their security in their own existence and 
future decisions, especially when the rest of the world is watching. This thesis will consider 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute as another factor in the rising tensions between China 
and Japan.  
This thesis does not aim to predict the future, but rather examine both countries’ 
governmental decisions via a nationalist lens. This is significant because this same 
evaluative mechanism on a single dispute could be used on another dispute to determine 
which type of nationalism is more likely to play a formative role in future Chinese and 
Japanese relations.  
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This study will help us better understand the role of economic, military and ethnic 
nationalism concerns in Japan and China. If either country made a decision regarding the 
islands, then I would expect nationalist sentiment to precede that, which in turn would spur 
the government into action. Additionally, government action might increase or decrease 
economic nationalism if the material is sensitive enough to affect different ethnicities. 
What remains to be found is the frequency or pattern of life for each type of nationalism.  
I expect to encounter elements from all three types of nationalism in my research 
findings because both countries, as discussed further in the literature review, have exhibited 
strong tendencies of each. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars have noted that many different factors shape nationalism, especially with 
respect to territorial conflict. One factor revolves around the idea of equality for all who 
are part of that nation, as the basis. This is most commonly known as liberal, or civic, 
nationalism and is usually found in democratic nations. Another factor revolves around the 
idea of ethnicity as the basis of creating a sense of nationalism. This is known as ethnic 
nationalism. Another factor revolves around the economy. Economic nationalism is easily 
indicative of the rise and fall of a nation’s economy. In some nations, the economy is tied 
more tightly to the military, or the government, and therefore, having a strong economy is 
important to that nation. An additional factor revolves around the military. Military 
nationalism, or militarism, is recognizable among those nations that have and use a strong 
military to support or further the nation’s agenda. As previously mentioned, military 
strength and economic strength can be interrelated. Yet another factor lies in the nation’s 
propensity to have an anti-imperial sentiment. Anti-imperialism draws heavily on those 
countries that were previously ruled under large colonizing empires. 
1. Liberal Nationalism 
The origins of liberal nationalism lie in one of many reasons for the American and 
French Revolutions. People gathered around the ideas of life, liberty, the pursuit of 
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happiness, equality or fraternity and fought for their own sovereignty.1 This school of 
thought also purports that man is neither slave to nor master of the institutions of his 
society, but part of a collective of people who chose what nationalism means to them. Their 
choices are not dictated by societal institutions. They can choose what societal structures 
exist and it gives that collective of people more reason to uphold their shared set of values. 
Liberal nationalism in its infancy was not the same as liberal nationalism of the 
present day, especially on the topic of equality. The concept of equality has shifted over 
time in America, and other parts of the world. At first, the only eligible voters were 
Caucasian land-owning males. People of any color, and women were not allowed to vote. 
As times and ideas changed inside this liberal nationalist society, the list of eligible voters 
gradually grew to include all adults, regardless of gender, race, or social status. There were 
measures in place to prevent voting from becoming a free-for-all, but as long as an 
individual followed the standard registration process, that individual was allowed to vote. 
This is one example of liberal values equally applied to a country’s population instead of a 
select ethnic group. This shows that liberal nationalism is more readily able to adapt to the 
ways and customs of the people in the community because it is not limited to specific 
ethnicity. 
2. Ethnic Nationalism 
Other scholars argue that nationalism comes from ethnicity. Unlike liberal 
nationalism, ethnic nationalism is a more specific form of nationalism. There are two main 
schools of thought as to its germination. On one hand, it is formed by the adherence to and 
homogeneity of a specific race, or ethnicity. This is the most exclusive in nature, because 
ethnicity cannot be adopted. People cannot choose their ethnicity like they can choose their 
ideals. People may be able to change their hair color with dye, their eye color with colored 
contacts, and even their skin and features with plastic surgery, but they will not be able to 
change their ethnicity. One is born into it. One cannot just one day, decide to become 
Japanese, or Filipino or Spanish if they are German, or African, or Indian. Swapping one’s 
 
1 Stefan Auer, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe (New York: Routledge 2004), 5. 
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ethnicity is not the same as swapping clothes or even intangible objects like beliefs. 
Ethnicity becomes a way in “which [it] links the members of ‘us’ because it emphasizes 
their differences from ‘them.’”2 One either fits the criteria or one does not. It can become 
a segregating factor rather than a unifying one. But for the country that exhibits or promotes 
homogeneity, it can be a powerful unifying factor. 
On the other hand, there is a group of scholars who argue that ethnicity must come 
after creating a state. After unification of a state, ethnicity is one of the elements used as a 
source of nationalism. One author calls it “fictive ethnicity” for it is the narrative and ethnic 
identity the state has determined for itself and the people within.3 By drawing on history 
to support this claim, the term ethnicity seems far less foreign and less fictive. For example, 
how can one have Italians without first making Italy?4 One example of a group that created 
its own history for an ethnicity were the Nazis. Although Nazi nationalism came from 
Adolf Hitler in Germany, it spread throughout Europe and its only requirements were strict 
Aryan guidelines. It did not matter that a person supported the Nazi cause; if that person 
did not meet specific delineated measurements, then that person was denied entry. But it 
also did not matter that one was born in Germany, or Poland, or Russia, if those guidelines 
were met. 
Ethnic nationalism is very specific, it depends on historical narrative for strength. 
It was not hard for Japan to consolidate its people under one common ethnic identity. Even 
before the island nation opened to the rest of the world, it had already developed an ‘us 
versus them’ mentality. The close knit nature enabled them to develop “‘the spirit of 
Japan...’ [that] the people…spirit and tradition [were] everything….[It was] a concept as 
old as historic Japan.”5 This spirit has been characterized as a flock or hive mentality, all 
persons working toward a common goal and until that goal is achieved, all focus on the 
 
2 Eric Hobsbawm, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today,” in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal 
Balakrishnan (London: Verso), 258, Kindle. 
3 Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in Becoming National, eds. Geoff Eley 
and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 140–141. 
4 Hobsbawm, “Ethnicity and Nationalism,” 257. 
5 Edwin P. Hoyt, The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WWII (New York: Donald I. 
Fine, 1985), 112.  
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end prize. “Once determined on a national course, the Japanese follow it…with enormous 
energy.”6 
In each of the two schools of thought, ethnic nationalism is very different than 
liberal nationalism. One section of ethnic nationalism depends on historical narrative for 
its strength. This is akin to the scholars that agree that nation-building is based solely on a 
nation’s past. Whereas liberal nationalism is open to anyone who subscribes to liberal 
political values, ethnic nationalism is limited to only people within a specific ethnic 
background. This is opposite liberal nationalism where nationalism is derived from a state 
of consciousness and specifically chosen. As briefly mentioned earlier in this section, 
unlike liberal nationalism, ethnic nationalism is highly exclusive. One can either claim that 
ethnicity or one cannot. One may be able to claim more than one ethnicity, but for those 
that are purists, those of mixed heritage may be excluded from the national group. As 
scholars have shown, ethno-nationalists often clash with other ethnic groups, since they 
perceive there to be hard differences between themselves and other countries.7 
3. Economic Nationalism 
Economic nationalism stems from scholars who agree that a nation was able to exist 
because of a strong economy. The economic processes of capitalism, such as open markets 
and supply and demand enabled countries to increase their economic power which also 
translated to the strength of their government. Markets became a meeting place for people, 
where they can exchange goods but also ideas, concepts, argue platforms, question 
decisions. Other scholars argue that nationalism arose out of economic development. 
Scholars of this variety claim that governments fostered nationalism in order to rally people 
around a shared commitment to economic growth. Typically, this process involved 
governments trying to have people shift their focus away from individual or familial 
concerns toward national development. Other scholars have highlighted how governments 
stress national loyalty over global ideologies such as religion or socialism, which could 
potentially undermine a citizen’s dedication to a specific state.  
 
6 Hoyt, The Militarists, 113. 
7 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6. 
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Other scholars link the rise of nationalism to what Benedict Anderson has called 
“print-capitalism.”8 As people met and gathered in markets to exchange goods, books and 
pamphlets also circulated. From that circulation, ideas spread, and controversy and change 
met a wider audience. People were able to express their thoughts in written form in the 
same language. The creation of these shared language communities made people aware 
that their individual concerns were part of a much broader group of people who all spoke 
the same language and who were all involved of pressuring governments to respond to their 
political concerns. With the rise “print-capitalism,” came a rise in the emphasis for 
education.9 This also strengthened nationalist movements because education became a way 
to inoculate the young with a certain set of ideals, which bred loyalty to a specific state. 
Adults also benefitted from education because they were then able to read and understand 
what was printed. Additionally, a nation focused on economic nationalism usually put into 
place policies that offered protection for domestic products and were directed toward 
supporting the country’s economy. If the government did not protect the people’s interests, 
then the people might rise in revolution due to monetary inequalities or class differences. 
4. Military Nationalism 
Military nationalism, or militarism as it is sometimes defined, is the notion that the 
military is the nationalist center of attention. The nation is centered on the existence of the 
military to maintain its own interests. As some authors argue, a nation’s military is formed 
by the citizens, for the citizens to protect their own interests internally and abroad.10 
Another reason that the military becomes a major part of nationalism is because of local 
pushback “against colonialism and foreign occupation.”11 Sometimes the image of a threat 
may seem greater than in actuality, when one entity or another takes and appropriates the 
military to their own ends. For example, some scholars argue that the United States took 
 
8 John Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism,” in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan 
(London: Verso), 159, Kindle. 
9 Breuilly, 159. 
10 For more on nationalism, see Becoming National: A Reader, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald 
Grigor Suny, and Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan. 
11 Gopal Balakrishnan, “The National Imagination” in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan 
(London: Verso), 210, Kindle. 
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on militarist characteristics during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when 
it used the Monroe Doctrine as justification to create the borders it has today. In the early 
stages of its formation, the United States used its military strength to overthrow British 
rule, obtain land from the Spanish, buy land from the French, and evict the Native 
Americans who had previously settled the land. Some would argue that the United States 
engaged in abusive militarism. Others would say it is just nationalism or nationalist pride. 
The relationship between these two aspects—militarism and nationalism—was directly 
proportional and can increase or decrease in equal measure.  
Within the boundaries of nationalism, most scholars consider militarism as the 
expression of a country’s nationalism through a powerful military. Given that militarism is 
one type of nationalism, both China and Japan have a large historical background of both 
types. As was the case with the newly minted United States, each country’s nationalism 
has also supported the militaristic aspect and vice versa; successful military ventures 
promoted nationalism. I will first illustrate Japanese and Chinese militarism then describe 
a brief overview of the history behind the Senkaku Islands and apply the developed 
parameters. 
5. Anti-imperial Nationalism 
Another form of nationalism is anti-imperial nationalism, or anti-imperialism. It is 
the opposite sentiment of imperialism, which implies a single nation’s rule and acquisition 
of territories.12 Nations that were previously under colonial rule tend to have a higher 
regard for their sovereignty than those who were not previously under colonial rule. It is a 
choice that is developed based on their circumstances. Scholars with this mindset believe 
that the people within have a choice to let their nationalism be decided based on the events 
that have occurred or decide it for themselves. One of the limiting factors of another 
scholar’s argument that a newly freed nation had their predecessor’s example to follow to 
organize their government.13 That was not always the case. For example, Great Britain, 
 
12 Stephen Howe, Empire: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 13.  
13 Partha Chatterjee, “Whose Imagined Community?” in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan 
(London: Verso), 183, Kindle. 
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France, Spain, and the Dutch carved their own individual empires within Southeast Asia. 
After the four empires vacated the region, Southeast Asian countries’ national identity was 
developed in stark contrast to their colonial predecessors.  
However, that power vacuum meant Southeast Asian countries were left to their 
own devices to develop as a nation. Some of the problems that being left to their own 
devices caused was a lack of knowledge about how to make processes work or be more 
successful. Those countries knew enough to not want another form of imperialistic rule. 
Anti-imperial nationalism can have elements of both ethnic and liberal nationalism. Anti-
imperial nationalists often build a strong ethnic component into their narratives of local 
identity. But depending on the severity, the colonizers may have not left much of a culture 
behind for those people to rebuild upon, and so anti-imperial nationalists often invent new 
traditions. Anti-imperial nationalism also does not necessarily tend toward democracy after 
the colonizers have left. It can just easily tend toward nationalist groups forming 
authoritarian institutions to hold together their weakly united country. 
6. Japanese Nationalism 
Japanese nationalism stems from several sources. First, there is the post-World War 
II memory and the Yoshida Doctrine, which is largely due to the U.S.-Japan alliance. They 
are divided by those who are for the alliance, and those who are not. This in turn also affects 
their views on the military forefront. Those who agree with the Yoshida doctrine and what 
it represents are okay with a smaller military. Those who are against it are not okay with a 
small military. Second, the Japanese constitution, specifically Article 9 and their use of 
force splits the country in two. How much force is too much force? What amount of use of 
the military is deemed unconstitutional? Third, there is the fading memory of World War 
II which affects how the political decisions made in the post war era are upheld or changed. 
The changing demographics influences this fading memory. As their population gets older 
and people who were not directly affected by the war step into positions of authority in 
politics and business.  
In Japan, militarism was promoted through a unified sense of nationalist spirit. 
Concerning “‘the spirit of Japan...’ the Japanese militarists had convinced themselves, and 
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then the people, that spirit and tradition [were] everything and physical power and capacity 
[were] as nothing compared to it--a concept as old as historic Japan.”14 This spirit has been 
characterized as a flock or hive mentality:  all persons working toward a common goal and 
until that goal is achieved, all focus on the end prize. “Once determined on a national 
course, the Japanese follow it…with enormous energy.”15 This mentality was clearly 
demonstrated in Japan’s pre-World War II military buildup. Another indication of pre-war 
military power is the use of the phrase ware-ware. Loosely translated, it means “we” in 
Japanese, but going deeper into a translation uncovers a more militaristic nuance. What is 
not typically translated is that ware-ware means: “We Japanese, the most favored and 
superior people of the world.”16 Similar to the way the Japanese characters for Greater 
East Asia War were banned after 1945, this phrase saw less use distinctly because of its 
association with military might.17 
This is where we see the split between liberals and conservatives: those for the 
military limitation and those against it. On one extreme, the pacifists believe that Japan 
should not have a military and remain peaceful. On the other extreme, there are those who 
advocate for Japan’s normalization; that is, develop and become more like most other 
countries with its own military to defend its interests. There are also several people whose 
beliefs lie anywhere in between. 
The economy is also important in Japan because businesses and government 
worked hand in hand to improve the economy. One explanation offered is that economic 
success replaced military nationalism post-World War II. Japan took advantage of its 
international position to increase manufacturing and put itself through another industrial 
revolution while still remaining relatively protectionist and isolated to improve its own 
 
14 Hoyt, The Militarists, 112.  
15 Hoyt, 113. 
16 Hoyt, 210. 
17 Peter Duus, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan Volume 6: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 381. 
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companies.18 This worked in their favor because even though some scholars argue that the 
economy was attained at social cost, it was still relatively stable and strong, and it has 
fostered strong national pride in Japanese economic success. 
Japan is made up of a collection of several different ethnic groups to include the 
Ainu and Okinawan (or Ryukyuan). However, the consensus among the Japanese 
population is that minorities are inferior to those who are “true” Japanese. This distinction 
leads to some internal unrest and differing of opinion, especially in the government. 
7. Chinese Nationalism 
Many scholars have noted that China’s history of imperial humiliation plays a large 
role in Chinese nationalism. Yet, one author notes, “[w]e must be sensitive to the difference 
between history and historical memory.”19 There is a difference between history and the 
way individuals or groups of people remember the same events. This includes all the 
emotional connotations and fading of memory as the generation that went through the 
experience grows older and does not necessarily pass down the true or whole knowledge, 
if at all, of what happened. As a result, the next generation gets a softer or hazier version 
of events. 
China is now drawing on its history to create a sense of national pride in a long 
history of grandeur and success as another form of nation building. The difference between 
history and historical memory might have strengthened their resolve. The example that 
comes to mind is how China’s Communist Party (CCP) is pulling elements of history, Sun 
Tzu and Confucius, to legitimize their rule and use it to instill a sense of nationalism in 
their population. When the CCP has the entire population’s full support, it can continue to 
further its agenda. 
China also had strong, economic, and nationalist attitude. Over the last few decades, 
the CCP has not only shepherded China through rapid economic development, it has also 
 
18 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 
277. 
19 Zheng Wang, Never Forget: National Humiliation Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and 
Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 15. 
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guided the country through two financial crises.20 China’s economic growth has also 
enabled them invest more in their military, which in turn has fueled further patriotic pride 
in the nation. In the news, China has broadcast several parades and ceremonies to unveil 
new equipment or celebrate a historical victory. This says a lot about wanting to foster 
pride in its people. This also sends a message to world that China is increasing its ability 
to project its forces in better ways. 
Concerning Chinese ethno-nationalism, several readings indicate that both 
government action and inaction has spurred protests regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island 
dispute.21 Some readings have not indicated whether anti-imperialist sentiment also 
spurred the action, but this can be inferred because the islands are contested territory.  
China also has its own powerful values, like Japan. This country held sway in the 
Pacific region for several thousands of years before the spread of the British Empire. The 
concept of zhongguo, translated “choseness,” is one example found in the Chinese 
language.22 Another translation for China, 12henzhou means “sacred” or “divine land”; a 
third translation, tianchao, means “celestial empire or heavenly dynasty.”23 The 
translations indicate a level of divine right that has been embedded in their culture for 
generations. China relied on the power of its military, and government to maintain a large 
area, in addition to its tributary countries. Its current rise can be described as decidedly 
militaristic. Using history as an analogy, “[B]ecause Germany’s economy was growing 
rapidly so could its fleet.”24 This describes an interlinkage between the economy and the 
military, and because China’s economy has grown, so too has its’ fleet. 
 
20 Yasheng Huang, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
21 Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
22 Wang, Never Forget, 42. 
23 Wang, 42.  
24 Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy (Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 59. 
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8. Island Dispute 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands25 are simply a chain of “five uninhabited islets and 
three rocks”26 or, features, located “about 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 
nautical miles east of mainland China, and about 200 nautical miles southwest of the city 
of Naha, Okinawa.”27 The islets, comprised of a total of 6.786 square kilometers, or 2.62 
square miles, are coveted for their economic value in fishing,28 and “possible hydrocarbon 
deposits lodged in the seabed.”29 China and Japan have contested over several pieces of 
land, but for this particular group of islands the fight can be traced back as early as the 12th 
century. The dispute is a visible manifestation of ethnic, economic, and military 
nationalism from China and Japan. 
Very little evidence existed prior to the 19th century regarding the islands. Based 
on strong indications, both China and Japan had weak claims to the islands. Though interest 
piqued after Japan’s takeover in 1895, the islands were not the focus of either country. 
The two countries have contested over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as early as the 
twelfth century. In 1372, the contested islets were used “as navigational reference points 
by Chinese imperial envoys traveling to the Ryukyu Kingdom.”30 The kingdom of 
Okinawa still paid tithings to China and its convoys used the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as 
navigational aids. In addition, some of the islands supported “a military post of Chinese 
 
25 Diaoyu Dao is the Chinese name for the islands and Senkaku Gunto is the Japanese name for the 
same set of features in the ocean. This paper attempts to remain neutral; the naming distinction of the 
islands is not the focus. Scholars writing from a Japanese perspective write about the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Island Dispute and, conversely, those writing from a Chinese perspective use the name Diaoyu/Senkaku. 
For the sake of consistency this paper refers to the islands by name using Senkaku or Senkaku/Diaoyu, but 
without implying any sort of bias regarding the debate. Additionally, much of the literature on the dispute 
involves the Republic of China, also known as Taiwan, but the focus will remain on the behaviors of the 
People’s Republic of China in Beijing and Japan. 
26 Hungdah Chiu, “An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the T’iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku 
Gunto),” Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 1, no. 150 (1999): 2. 
27 Han-Yi Shaw, “The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the 
Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan,” Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary 
Asian Studies 3, no. 152 (1999): 10. 
28 Shaw, “The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute,” 11. 
29 Chiu, “An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute,” 3. 
30 Shaw, “The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute,” 11. 
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naval forces, and an operational base by fishermen from Taiwan.”31 According to Chinese 
records, the Japanese had no recorded involvement with the islands until the late 1800s.  
By the late 1800s, after Japan had won the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese took 
over the islands, collected extensive evidence via several on-site surveys that the islands 
were uninhabited, and therefore were subject to new jurisdiction. In addition, the 
government of Japan took action to include these islands in Okinawa Prefecture. 
Meanwhile, the islands had come under private lease to an Okinawan citizen, who built 
upon the island and kept the contract within the Koga family. By 1932, Zenji Koga was the 
official owner of the Senkaku Islands. World War II was another turning point for the 
islands. With Japan’s surrender and the Treaty of San Francisco, the United States took 
administrative control of the Ryukyu Island chain to include the Senkaku Islands. At the 
end of the United States’ jurisdiction in 1971, it handed the islands over to Japan. 
If China narrated the same timeline, one would hear that the islands were, and still 
are, strictly Chinese territory. When Japan conquered the islands after winning the Sino-
Japanese war, China perceived them as having been stolen. When the United States handed 
them back to Japan, China bristled at the obvious favoritism. And so, tensions continued 
to grow. A series of protests and activist movements stemmed from both countries over the 
subsequent forty years.  
In 2008, two Chinese Marine Surveillance ships entered the territorial waters. 
Though not determined as military vessels, this event foreshadowed the rising numbers of 
Chinese vessels that established a new normal in the territorial waters of the islands. The 
waters are calm between January 2009 and September 2010. This brings the timeline up to 
the year the Japanese Coast Guard vessel and Chinese fishing vessel collided. 
 
31 Shaw, “The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute,” 11. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND HYPOTHESES 
(1) Hypothesis 1: Ethnic nationalism is relatively more important than 
economic or military nationalism in China and Japan.  
Ethnic nationalism is much more easily identifiable than the other two types, but it 
does not mean that it is relatively more important. It manifests itself in language, food, 
style, even political decisions. However, it can explain motive behind several cultural 
occurrences in both countries. In China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using age-
old wisdom from Confucius to reestablish their political legitimacy as a party. In Japan, 
the word gaijin refers to anyone who is foreign. Nihonjin refers to those who are native 
Japanese. To the very conservative, even the Okinawans and Ainu were not considered 
Japanese though they live in the country. No matter how fluent one is in Japanese, unless 
one was born on the mainland, one is still gaijin. 
The largest body of support for this hypothesis would lie in the political parties in 
power and the decisions they made over the islands. The evidence would be the people in 
power who make decisions and what beliefs and convictions drive their decisions. It is very 
difficult to discern internal feelings and perceptions. As such, I would only look at 
published political decisions that came to pass instead of trying to analyze what people 
were thinking. I would look at news articles translated into English during that time period.  
This hypothesis seems most likely to be correct if the results are based on the large 
amount of scholarship that already exists. However, this hypothesis is limited in nature 
because it discounts the possibility that more than one type of nationalism has affected 
Chinese and Japanese political decisions on the island dispute. It also discounts the concept 
of globalization; countries are less isolated than they were two hundred years ago. 
Globalization also brings with it cross-ethnic marriages and mixed ethnicity offspring. 
(2) Hypothesis 2: Economic nationalism is relatively more important than 
ethnic or military nationalism in China and Japan.  
Evidence to support this could be found in growing exports, bi- and multilateral 
trade agreements, foreign aid, collateral loans, increased monetary and military power, as 
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well as editorials or translated newspaper articles. Influence in and among other countries 
in the East and Southeast Asia region is a strong indicator of increased economic power.  
Japan’s perception of its economic role in East Asia stems from economic power. 
Japan is concerned for its continued economic security as China wields its growing 
economy, and equally growing military. China is less concerned with Japan and more 
concerned with its place in the rest of the world. This is evident in its investment in bilateral 
agreements in the region as well as less developed countries such as Africa and parts of 
Latin America, and their expansion into the South China Sea. This is also evident in 
President Xi Jinping’s acceptance of China’s single digit gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth, also known as the “New Normal.” Up until recently, GDP growth has maintained 
the party’s legitimacy. Now that China has entered a “New Normal” phase, the Party may 
have to use another platform besides economic growth to maintain legitimacy. But because 
it has transformed economic downturn into a new platform of legitimacy suggests 
otherwise. 
The information I would expect to find to support this hypothesis is policy that is 
very economically oriented. The islands generate their own attention which then feeds 
Japan and China’s individual markets from protestors traveling to the island to fishermen 
on boats traveling there as well. Additionally, both countries have sent their military over 
to support. Another piece of evidence that would support is increased investment in 
research and development projects. Research and development is another way of saying 
ingenuity; both countries need ingenuity because the current market is starting to develop 
diminishing returns. 
(3) Hypothesis 3: Military nationalism, or militarism, is relatively more 
important than ethnic and economic nationalism in China and Japan. 
This hypothesis has a partial foothold on the possibility of being correct. Militarism 
can be dual-hatted. At the same time, it can either support or be supported by economic or 
ethnic nationalism. But the strongest argument for its existence in both countries is their 
current move toward a larger military. In China’s case, that is becoming a physical reality. 
In Japan’s case, that is mostly fought in parliament and in the Diet policy argument. The 
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military was also strongly present in both countries’ histories. China saw itself for a long 
time as the ruler of the middle kingdom, with Japan and Korea as its tributaries. Japan 
developed a large military for the colonization of East and Southeast Asia. 
The type of evidence that I expect to find to support this hypothesis would be found 
in each country’s white papers, as well as any type of military parade, press conference, or 
other publicity stunt to further promote the military. Though this is not specifically related 
to the islands, the timing and release of the white papers, especially those that announce 
military growth, are key. As a foil to hypothesis 2, China or Japan’s use of their economy 
to support military growth would be another type of evidence to support this claim. 
(4) Hypothesis 4: It is a combination of all three that are relatively important 
because ethnic nationalism feeds economic growth, which in turn helps 
increase military strength. Conversely, military can help or undermine 
economic growth, which is closely linked to ethnic nationalism. 
This hypothesis seems most likely, because each strand of nationalism holds a 
tenuous interdependent relationship with the others. Given that a singular nationalism 
strain may not be of sole importance, the argument for a combination of all three strains of 
nationalism makes the most sense. Historical narrative and historical memory is also 
included in this hypothesis. This is seen in the way the central government pulls from the 
past to provide political legitimacy. By emphasizing the historical philosophers, the Party 
likens China back to a time when it was the center of its universe. Both countries have 
memories of previous strength. Japan still has a long memory as seen by the number of 
memorials and monuments to the past. They have a stronghold on the past that also gets 
passed down from generation to generation. China has memories of its greatness prior to 
its own Century of Humiliation. 
Increased economic strength can lead to stronger pride in one’s nation and more 
resources to provide for a stronger military. As mentioned in the second hypothesis, 
economic nationalism is a strong factor in boosting pride in a national military. If a country 
has more money, it is easier for them to invest in research and development, or its defense 
budget, as in China’s case. Japan on the other hand, is restricted under the Yoshida 
Doctrine. The Yoshida Doctrine was written by the United States as Japan’s constitution 
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after World War II. It prevented Japan’s use of a military; to this day, Japan has a self-
defense force, not a military. Article 9 of the constitution prevents Japan from using war 
as means of conflict resolution. Since Japan’s defeat in World War II, it has had to rely on 
other measures besides the military to establish itself in the region. 
The strength of this hypothesis would come from comparing and drawing 
connections from all three strands of nationalism from each country from 2010 to present 
day. That means paying attention to recurring themes, and reasons or motivations for 
making such political decisions (as much as can be gleaned from academic scholarship and 
primary documents). 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
My research examines open-source documents from each country as well as 
academic scholarship. I study the political decisions of China and Japan regarding the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute to assess the relative importance of three strands of 
nationalism: ethnic, economic, and military. I evaluate the relative importance of each 
countries’ public actions starting with the Japanese Coast Guard and Chinese trawler 
collision in 2010, and Japan’s purchase of the islands in 2012. This attempts to establish a 
baseline for how each country’s governmental policy behaves regarding a major territorial 
dispute. In this way, it sets a framework for analyzing future interactions between these 
two countries and a precedent on any future interactions. I am relying on sources written 
in English. The primary sources are policy papers from government websites. The 
secondary sources are academic books, journals, newspapers, and economic data from 
reputable databases. These sources provide context in order to evaluate my hypotheses. 
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II. 2010 INCIDENT: COLLISION BETWEEN A JAPANESE 
COAST GUARD VESSEL AND CHINESE TRAWLER 
This chapter looks at the incident that occurred on September 7, 2010, a collision 
between the Japanese Coast Guard vessel and Chinese trawler, and the subsequent actions 
that further exacerbated and brought to the forefront the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands. This chapter examines the naval actions between the two countries and the 
economic connection between the two countries. While it seems like this incident should 
have sparked more violent relations between the two countries, the countries’ desire to 
maintain economic stability took precedence. Economic stability in the region is important 
because these countries are neighbors who are dependent on each other and the resources 
of the region. 
A. HISTORICAL RECAP 
Before we delve into the incident itself, here is a quick overview of the militaristic 
nationalism of the island dispute. It is important to note that before World War II, military 
nationalism between both countries concerning the islands varied in strength and use 
depending on the time period. When China lost its grip on the Asian region to the British, 
Japan took advantage of that weakness and filled it. In the early period of the Meiji 
Restoration, Japan’s military successes in the first Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese 
War carried them through to the Second Sino-Japanese War. It was in this first Sino-
Japanese War that Japan took possession of the Senkaku Island chain.32 These two wars 
are the first two instances of Japanese militarism toward the Chinese regarding the islands. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. took center stage as a world power. 
Military nationalism diminished considerably in both countries. The islands were never a 
target during the Cold War, but ownership remained contested. There were several treaties 
and negotiations that took place with United States involvement, but ultimately returned 
control back to Japan. Neither China nor Japan was able to support or contest the turnover. 
 
32 Chiu, “An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute,” 17–18. 
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China had not developed the equipment or economy it has today, and Japan was 
constrained under the Yoshida Doctrine.33 Though there were a series of protests over the 
years, military action did not occur until 2010. 
B. DURING THE 2010 INCIDENT 
The year 2010 marked a significant increase in activity between both countries over 
the islands. On September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing vessel collided into a Japanese Coast 
Guard patrol boat. The damage was minimal, but China maintained it was an accident 
whereas Japan thought it was deliberate. The incident was further exacerbated in Japan 
when one Japanese officer posted the video of the collision online. When Japan detained 
and charged the captain and his crew for “obstructing officers in their line of duty,” incited 
further anger in China.34 Though the crew was released six days later, the captain was held 
for an additional seventeen days after the incident.35 Relations between the two countries 
deteriorated, and the long captivity caused a severe decrease in their relations. Because 
Beijing considered this an affront to the relative peace the two countries reached over the 
island dispute, the quality of bilateral talks decreased sharply, economic joint ventures were 
broken off, and other interactions involving Japan halted. 
Both countries experienced escalating tension, though neither wanted to risk further 
violence. In this matter, China remained neutral to Japan’s use of force. However, when 
the anniversary of the Japanese invasion and takeover of Manchuria in 1931 (an ideal 
example of Japanese militarism at its most potent) came and went, and the captain was still 
detained, the Chinese public reacted. But in order to keep the protests from taking on an 
inward spin, the focus remained on the islands. Even then-Premier, Wen Jiabao, claimed 
that the islands were “sacred territory.”36 But he did not explicitly direct the military to 
defend and retake the islands. Though the number of vessels entering within territorial 
 
33 The Yoshida Doctrine became Japan’s constitution after World War II. Article 9 of this doctrine 
stated that the country was no longer allowed to maintain a military force, rather, they created what is now 
known as their Self Defence Forces. 
34 John Garver, China’s Quest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 724. 
35 Garver, 724. 
36 Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 175. 
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waters challenging Japanese claim to the islands increased sharply, it does not differentiate 
between civilian craft, Chinese Maritime Militia, or Chinese naval vessels. Japan’s count 
of China’s intrusions may have been a factor in the island dispute but maintaining domestic 
stability and economic growth seemed to be a larger factor. 
Based on the historical trend, Japan displayed more militarism than China, with a 
two to one ratio. During the 2010 incident, Japan was decidedly militaristic compared to 
China. Whether it was accidental or not, these events occurred.37 The Chinese vessel 
collided with the Japanese Coast Guard vessel that led to a series of militarist actions on 
both sides as discussed in the next section. The next section will look the actions of both 
parties after the 2010 incident. 
C. AFTER THE INCIDENT 
The below information is discussed in this section since it deals with the same 
subject matter as the chapter: the military actions of both countries in and around the 
Senkaku/Daioyu Islands. Japan’s political action of purchasing the islands does bear some 
consideration. It is discussed here in detail, though briefly mentioned in the following 
chapter. As depicted in Figure 1, Chinese vessels demonstrated increased activity in 2012, 
likely in response to Tokyo’s official purchase of the islands from Koga on September 11. 
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) noted that intrusions occurred 
approximately three times a month by Chinese government vessels, though some months 
experienced up to seven or eight instances.38 A RAND study showed Chinese Coast Guard 
vessels intruded 68 times in the remainder of 2012.39 In 2013, that number jumped to 188. 
 
37 Though nothing official was published, there are rumors and conjectures that the Chinese trawler 
captain was one, under the influence, and two, possibly a member of the Chinese Maritime Militia, which 
would make his actions military. All of this is speculation based on what one can hear from the unofficial 
video posted online and went viral shortly after the collision. 
38 “Chinese Vessels Entering Senkaku Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,” Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000180283.pdf.  
39 Lyle J. Morris, “The New ‘Normal’ in the East China Sea,” RAND Corporation, accessed March 
20, 2018, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/02/the-new-normal-in-the-east-china-sea.html. 
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At least three of those intrusions were Chinese PLA vessels, not just coast guard.40 There 
were comparable numbers in 2014 and 2015, at 88 and 86, respectively. But in December 
2015 there was inconsistency in Chinese behavior; MOFA observed visible cannons on 
select Chinese ships. This anomaly was partially the result of previous incursions where 
unarmed Chinese vessels were escorted by armed Japanese ships.41 
 




40 The Chinese Maritime Militia are civilian owned and operated ships that give an inconsistent and 
irregular portion of their time to carry out military orders. But since there is ambiguity, it is hard to 
determine intent and whether they were “just fishing” or actually conducting a military operation at the 
higher direction of the PLA (N). 
41 Morris, “The New ‘Normal’ in the East China Sea.” 
42 Source: Status of Activities by Chinese Government Vessels and Chinese Fishing Vessels in Waters 
surrounding the Senkaku Islands (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000180283.pdf. 
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Routine measures by both countries continued in very much the same manner 
through 2016, until August 5–9 when a flotilla of 300 Chinese fishing vessels was escorted 
by 15 Chinese naval vessels. This anomaly is an important spike and show in Chinese 
militarism. In 2017, the trend continued, but instead of two Chinese vessels, the typical 
number became four vessels.,43 On January 8, 2018, four Chinese Coast Guard vessels 
made an unsurprising visit as China again established a new normal for the New Year.44 
Though four vessels quickly became a trend for the rest of 2017 and into 2018, it is 
important to note the change can be considered another sign of increased militarism. The 
sheer volume of traffic, as well as Chinese Coast Guard visibility is a subtle but definite 
signal to increased militarism. 
On Japan’s side, their coast guard was deployed often enough to issue warnings to 
both fishing vessels and government vessels alike, as many as 25 times a day in some cases. 
The chart above depicts aggregated data of the number of vessels that were issued warnings 
each year. The bracket for Note 2 indicates that the number of vessels decreased from the 
year 2014 to 2015 because of a “strengthening of responses” from the Japanese Coast 
Guard in the area.45 From that data, Japan has been expending time, money, and effort to 
patrol the waters with clearly marked coast guard vessels. As a result, this is also a clear 
indication of their increased sense of militarism. 
However, there are two notable incidents that represent an increase in militarism 
after the 2010 collision. The first is the Chinese flotilla with her escorts. The second is the 
change from a quantity of Chinese vessels that patrol the waters. It changed from two ships 
to four ships in the subsequent recent years. Despite the perceived imbalance in military 
action and response, both countries’ governments understand that fomenting a war between 
the two countries over the islands is not the best path. Both countries understand the 
 
43 Katie Hunt, “How an Uninhabited Island Chain Splits Japan and China,” CNN, February 6, 2017, 
ProQuest; Yoko Wakatsuki and Junko Ogura, “Japan: China’s ‘Escalating’ Tensions over Disputed 
Islands,” CNN, May 19, 2017, ProQuest; Jiji Kyodo, “Two Chinese Coast Guard Vessels Intrude into 
Japanese Waters off Aomori Prefecture,” The Japan Times, July 17, 2017, ProQuest; Ankit Panda, “4 
China Coast Guard Vessels Enter Japan-Administered Waters Near Disputed East China Sea Islands,” The 
Diplomat, January 4, 2018, ProQuest. 
44 Panda, “4 China Coast Guard Vessels.” 
45 Panda. 
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importance of maintaining economic stability despite the military activity, which is why 
both have been careful not to push the envelope. 
D. ECONOMIC CONNECTION 
The economic connection between China and Japan was one of the more significant 
factors that prevented a rise in tensions between the two countries in the East China Sea. 
Since the end of World War II, Japan was giving China economic assistance labeled as a 
program instead of as aid.46, 47 That all changed when China took over as the second-
largest economy in 2010. “In the 40 years over which the aid programme lasted, Japan 
provided China 4.65 trillion yen to support infrastructure and humanitarian projects and 
environmental protection.”48 This amount of money was not well advertised even though 
it was not supposed to be called aid. “China hasn’t been telling much about the Japanese 
aid to its people, but it was considered to have had a positive impact over the years,” said 
Yu Tiejun of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University.”49 
The Japanese assistance program positively impacted China’s ability to develop. 
Despite this incident between the two ships in September, the two countries did not want 
to upset the modicum of peace that had been reached via trade over the last forty years. “In 
2010, China was the primary trade partner for South Korea and Japan, and Japan was the 
second largest trade partner for China and South Korea.”50 According to World’s Top 
Exports website, Japan slipped to third place in 2018, but trade was still valued at 6% or 
 
46 Shaid Javed Burki, “In Japan, China finds a new friend,” The Express Tribune, November 5, 2018, 
ProQuest. 
47 Burki also notes that any type of foreign aid was seen as negative due to the “…political sensitivity 
about formal war apologies…,” and the concept that aid was given to developing countries exclusively. 
China did not want to have that connotation associated between them and Japan. 
48 Burki.  
49 Burki.  
50 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Economic-Security Linkages in Asia,” in The Oxford Handbook of the 
International Relations of Asia, ed. Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, (Oxford: Oxford 
Handbooks Online, October 2014), 8. 
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$137.4 billion.,51 China was first on the top five list of countries Japan had the highest 
amounts of imports and exports, according to World Integrated Trade Solutions, a World 
Bank group.52 According to an article on the Japan International Freighters Forwarders 
Association Inc., the first half of 2010 set a new record with a 34.5% to US$138.4 billion.53 
This new record invigorated Japan’s economy and raised spirits for record growth that was 
last realized in 2008. This was good news for the economy, and a military altercation would 
have (and did) upset that upward trend. 
From China’s perspective, the import and export numbers were comparable. China 
imported US$ 176,736 million worth of goods from Japan.54 After the Chinese trawler 
incident, China reportedly blocked exports of its rare-earth minerals to Japan.55 This was 
an example of one publicized retaliatory and quite possibly “necessary measure” that China 
took to level the playing field. It was rather significant too, due to Japan’s reliance on rare-
earth minerals used heavily in technology production. 
Although Japan was third on China’s top export list, China topped both imports and 
exports for Japan. This is a good indicator for high inter-relatability and need to keep 
tensions low. These rankings stayed the same in the following year fiscal year, given that 
the 2010 trawler incident happened late in the fourth quarter. Since the early 1990s, China, 
Japan, and South Korea—the major states in Northeast Asia—have gradually deepened 
economic interdependence through expanding trade and investment. The share of 
intraregional trade among the three states increased from 12.3 percent in 1990 to 19.0 
 
51 Daniel Workman, “China’s Top Trading Partners,” World’s Top Exports, accessed August 5, 2019, 
http://www.worldstopexports.com/chinas-top-import-partners/; Yoshimatsu, “Economic-Security Linkages 
in Asia,” 2. 
52 World Integrated Trade Solution, “Japan Trade Summary, 2010,” accessed June 1, 2019, 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/JPN/Year/2010/Summarytext. 
53 Japan International Freighters Forwarders Association Inc, “Japan-China Trade Hits Records in 
First Half 2010,” accessed June 1, 2019, https://www.jiffa.or.jp/en/news/100820.html. 
54 World Integrated Trade Solutions, “China Trade Summary, 2010,” accessed June 1, 2019. 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/2010/SummaryText. 
55 Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tensions, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” New York Times, 
September 23, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?auth=login-
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percent in 1996 and to 21.9 percent in 2010.56 The interdependency of the region vis-à-vis 
economics is surprisingly strong. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Gradual but increased escalation on both sides seemed to have become the new 
normal without aggressively drawing attention to the dispute. As such, it is hard to deny 
both countries’ increased reliance on military measures. Japan did not appear to relent 
because to relinquish the islets would appear subservient to China as well as diminish any 
political currency the current party had with the people. This was something that Japan had 
fought against since the Sino Japanese War of 1895. China did not seem as perturbed to 
maintain this gradual escalation. Unlike Japan, China was able to devote a larger 
percentage of their budget and resources to military. Despite seeming more militaristic, it 
was the use of the military that was the determining factor. 
Both sides have invested far too much in remembering what was done to the other 
for these islands. That memory is what feeds the increased militarism over territorial 
conflict, but it is the economic stability that tempers it. Though neither side appears to be 
prepared to go to war over these islands, Japan is concerned with maintaining ownership 
of the islands. China, in recent years, changed the status quo to either suit its own needs or 
provoke Japan to react negatively to that change. Whether or not the diplomats from both 
countries can broker an agreement remains to be seen. One common theme among Chinese 
and Japanese disputes is postponing—solving the problem for another day in favor of 
benefitting economically. Based on the historical review of the 2010 incident, and review 
of subsequent maritime actions on both sides, the island dispute has led to increased 
military nationalism after a territorial clash or incident between the two countries, though 
it has not yet escalated to the point of war. Both countries are less prepared to invest in 
starting a conventional war because it would disrupt the current economic stability and 
profitability both countries have achieved. The recurring trend is that this dispute is 
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continually pushed to the next generation. How long can both countries hold this status quo 
before it crumbles under external pressures? 
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III. 2012 INCIDENT: JAPAN PURCHASES ISLANDS 
This chapter examines the incident that occurred on September 10, 2012, when the 
Japanese government purchased the islands from their private owner to prevent then-Tokyo 
Governor Ishihara from doing so. Though the actions of the Japanese government were 
upsetting to the Chinese, the government’s purchase of the islands put the focus on the 
entirety of Japan instead of a single prefecture. This chapter will mainly exclude much of 
the military actions discussed in the previous chapter. However, that does not exclude how 
much military actions, or lack thereof, have affected the outcome. Since both countries are 
still heavily involved in each other’s economic well-being, both will do what they can to 
maintain a stable economy, which is another reason that economics are a much larger factor 
in changing or keeping the status quo in this dispute. 
A. BEFORE THE PURCHASE 
Over the longer term, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute is one small blip in the 
two economically interdependent countries. Both countries have made efforts to “maintain 
the lucrative trade and investment relations that both countries have enjoyed since 1972.”57 
This reaffirms the fact that “…high levels of economic interdependence between states 
reduce the likelihood of conflict and war…”58 However, “…the changing nature of the 
Sino-Japanese economic relationship enabled China to act more assertively as its economic 
dependence on Japan decreased.”59 There is an estimated $350 billion trade comprised of 
goods and services annually between the two countries.60 This number has been typical 
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over the years of their economic relationship and is relevant to the behaviors and attitudinal 
changes that occurred after the purchase (as discussed in the next section). 
Since 2008, (and to include the incidents discussed in the last chapter), there have 
been several overtures to develop and strengthen the maritime relationships and 
communication pathways between China and Japan. “These include the Japan-China 
Maritime Communications Mechanism (JCMCM), the Maritime Search and Rescue 
Cooperation Agreement (SAR Agreement), and the High-Level Consultation on Maritime 
Affairs (High Level Consultation)….[N]one of the three agreements has been signed or 
implemented.”61 The close encounters between the two countries’ ships seem to drive 
diplomatic meetings. But nothing was resolved during those diplomatic meetings because 
neither country was willing to concede their claims.  
In 2012, several events foreshadowed the purchase of the islands later that year. 
Early on, the Japanese government announced the intent to and named several of 
the Senkaku and other islands.62 On January 26, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura 
announced the government’s intent to name several of Japan’s distant islands, an action 
which sparked little interest from the British Broadcasting Channel, and none from any 
Japanese newspapers translated to English. Three months later, Japan extended the naming 
to register one of the Senkaku Islands as a national asset. The media mentioned the 2010 
rare earths sanctions China enacted, but nothing about the registration and increased claim 
to sovereignty. 
In April, Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro revealed that the Tokyo Municipal 
Government planned to purchase three of the privately owned islands. A week and a half 
later, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government opened a bank account for the people.63 None 
of this information was published by the Japanese (and subsequently translated to English) 
news sources until the next day by The Japan Times. Instead of adding emotion to the 
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article, it was factual and to the point. Despite the subjective reporting, Tokyo’s actions 
opened an avenue for nationalist sentiment to foment. Strangely enough, during the 
remaining two months, the government’s overt support of Japanese ownership of the 
Senkaku Islands did not make the news at all. 
That summer, Tokyo filed a petition to survey the land; there were Chinese, 
Taiwanese, and Hong Kong reactions to civilians landing on the islands. The Japan Times 
published two stories in as many days about Japan’s efforts to stake claim to the islands. 
The first story on August 25, 2012, argued for peace, by insisting that both governments 
exercise self-restraint and “prevent provocative actions by their citizens.”64 This article 
preempts the government announcement of island purchase as if it was a cautionary tale of 
self-restraint to future reactions. On September 4, 2012, the Japanese government 
announced that purchase plans were being finalized.65 The second article reported that 
over 1.4 billion yen66 was raised in the bank account the Tokyo government opened back 
in April.67 This is the first example of quantitative data that indicated how much the public 
supported their country’s claim. When the Japanese government formally announced that 
it had purchased the islands, The Japan Times published a lengthy article that gave an 
overview of reasons why Japanese citizens should support the purchase and what the 
Japanese Coast Guard has been doing to bolster defenses in the region.68 One of the articles 
implies that such measures, though necessary in order to protect Japanese assets, should 
not be needed because Japan conducted surveys in 1895 to determine ownership.69 With 
those facts and plans in place, Japan officially bought the Senkaku Islands from their 
private owner on September 10, 2012. 
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B. AFTER THE PURCHASE 
By purchasing the islands, Japan sent a message to the rest of the world that these 
islands belong only to Japan and no one else. Most Japanese consider the Senkaku Islands 
as Japanese, and to change that perception would be difficult. For this reason, combined 
with “the spirit of Japan” mentality, perception and national sentiment could deter any 
future chance at finding resolution to the disputed islands. 
The people, the state, historical memory, and the media are responsible for creating 
China’s behavior toward and image of Japan. “People in China see every Japanese act 
through the lens of history and fail to recognize the impact of China’s own actions on 
Japan.”70 Those same people think that stronger government policy measures should be 
taken against Japan.71 One citizen said they would donate their life if the army fought 
against Japan, instead of donating merely a month’s salary if the Chinese army fought 
against Taiwan or even a year’s worth of wages if the Chinese army fought against the 
United States.72 
State nationalism is driven from the top down and affects people’s beliefs.73 It has 
three features. One, “it identifies the Chinese Nation closely with the communist 
state….The state claims it represents the whole nation and advances the nations’ interests 
rather than just the interests of the state.”74 Two, “Chinese state nationalism is guided by 
pragmatism, which by definition is behavior disciplined by neither a set of values nor 
established principles.”75 This runs in concert with Deng Xiaoping’s allegory about the 
economy:  a cat is a cat as long as it catches mice, it does not matter if it is black or white. 
In other words, as long as it fulfills its’ purpose, its’ color or form does not matter. And 
thirdly, “in response to perceived foreign pressure that was said to erode, corrode or 
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endanger the national interest of China, state nationalism…was more reactive than 
proactive in international affairs.”76 
Given that annual trade between China and Japan was upwards of $350 billion 
before Japan purchased the islands, that statistic was at odds with what happened after the 
purchase.77 As alluded to in the previous section, after Japan announced its plan to 
purchase the islands, the Chinese government issued a “…series of economic retaliatory 
measures, including boycotting Japanese products and delaying working visas for Japanese 
company employees.”78  
This informal Chinese boycott of Japanese goods has led to a sharp fall in Japan’s 
exports to China, raising the risk of another Japanese recession. China remains Japan’s 
largest overseas market.79 This has led to the belief among many Chinese leaders “…that 
Japan needs China more than China needs Japan.’”80 China set that tone by its diplomatic 
and military actions after this incident. 
One article from Daily Yomiuri printed in early October encouraged the 
government to correct China’s propaganda and at the same time support Foreign Minister 
Gemba’s call for open dialogue to reduce tensions.81 Though not a newspaper article, the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry published a position paper in response to China’s continued 
“unilateral escalat [ion]” at the end of the year.82 This is in addition to an editorial that 
condemns China’s actions as uncalled-for intrusions.83 
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As discussed more thoroughly in the previous chapter, China’s military response is 
probably the most visible of their reactions to the purchase of the islands. Though that does 
not mean it is absent from diplomatic overtures as well. The most prevalent was its’ display 
of “warships to support its sovereignty claims.”84 The Japanese kept better published 
records of each incursion than the Chinese. China sent a signal of displeasure when it 
cancelled the military exchange program with the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in 
2012 due to the Japan’s nationalization of the islands.85 In 2013, China announced a new 
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), with several strict measures for aircraft that 
intended to cross its’ boundaries.86 Several countries, including Japan and the United 
States disagreed and refused to comply but China’s response to those infractions was 
minimal.87 
Chinese Foreign Ministry created a precedent of being difficult to work with, which 
caused inherent difficulties for foreign ministries such as Japan’s, to discuss possible 
resolutions to their problems. The Chinese Foreign Ministry is extremely fragmented and 
information sharing is low on its priority list.88 That is unfortunately due to “the relative 
low priority of foreign affairs compared to domestic concerns like economic growth and 
political stability.”89 Japan has no way of knowing if their messages to China’s ministers 
“reach the higher levels of Beijing’s authority structure.”90 It has been noted that there is 
a “relative weakness of the Chinese Foreign Ministry against its Japanese counterpart.”91 
This is probably caused by the perception that the Chinese Foreign Ministry has less 
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authority and influence relative to the rest of the government.92 It is also important to note 
that “Sino-Japanese fisheries relationship is built on over 50 years of dialogue on…issues 
that preceded the establishment of formal diplomatic relations.”93 
China’s government “head [ed] off a military confrontation over the oil and gas 
fields through quiet negotiation” even though China made motions to take Japan to 
International Court, that action never materialized.94 Instead, China took other forms of 
“…necessary measures to defend its sovereignty.”95 Instead of raising the stakes, China 
did not let the matter go, but still maintained some semblance of a status quo to allow for 
continued trade between the two countries.  
China did not take Japan to International Court, however. Instead, China continued 
to maintain that the purchase is “illegal and invalid.”96 In a statement that Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Hong Lei made, he emphasized the criminality of Japan’s actions in order to 
assert their sovereignty and legitimacy. He used the phrase “necessary measures,” which 
was vague and undetermined. That gives China the leeway of continual interpretation of 
their words and flexibility in their execution. Based on China’s actions, these measures 
have included increased maritime activity in not only the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island chain, 
but also several islands in the South China Sea. The more assertive these actions were, the 
less effective backchannel diplomacy became. 
One interpretation of China’s necessary measures is evidenced by their stalling 
tactics. China has used what some call a delaying strategy, where ithe government “tries to 
hold what it has without using [more] force to escalate the issue.”97 In the case of the 
purchase of the islands, China did the opposite: it “sen [t] patrol ships into the water within 
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12 nautical miles of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.”98 According to Japanese records, 
Chinese vessels demonstrated increased activity in 2012, likely in response to Tokyo’s 
official purchase of the islands from Koga on September 11. A RAND study showed 
Chinese Coast Guard vessels intruded 68 times in the remainder of 2012.99 Despite all that, 
economic stability remained steady. 
Deng Xiaoping once said that China’s greatest problem is the threat of 
instability.100 To maintain stability China must keep its people happy. To keep its people 
happy, China must maintain their improved standard of life. The easiest method is vis-à-
vis economic prosperity. China must balance the demands of the people with its economic, 
international, and military agenda. Until the population makes the island dispute an issue 
that keeps President Xi Jinping up at night, China’s continued efforts should remain 
minimal. Since 2012, China has not used severe enough measures to incite stronger 
Japanese backlash regarding the islands, but the measures China has enacted are barriers 
toward conflict resolution. 
C. ECONOMIC LINKAGES 
In this incident, we still see some tendencies toward maintaining economic stability 
between China and Japan. But there are a few exceptions. Unlike in previous chapters, the 
purchase of the islands happened wholly on Japanese soil. This occurrence rather 
threatened Chinese resolve to keep economic actions stable. As Susan Shirk noted, “the 
government retains the ability to encourage or suppress collective action on nationalist 
issues like Japan:  the September 2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations were facilitated from 
above.”101 This means that any efforts to pursue regional economic cooperation can be 
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hurt by political friction.102 And the reverse is also true. An increase in political friction 
hurts future attempts at regional economic cooperation. 
China made unprecedented responses regarding the action as a provocation 
to change the status quo….[This] included lodging angry protests, 
ratcheting up state media coverage over the nationalization, feature 
bellicose commentary, and tolerating for awhile the biggest anti-Japan 
demonstration marked by violent acts targeting Japanese interests, such as 
looting shops and restaurants, smashing Japanese-made cars, burning 
buildings of some Japanese companies and ransacking some Japanese 
supermarkets.103 
Despite the fact that the 2012 incident adds to historical memory by “inhibit [ing] 
the fostering of trust among China [and] Japan,” increased commercial transactions 
between the two countries have worked to counter that poison.104 Economic trade 
essentially greases the wheels of communication. As Hidetaka Yoshimatsu has observed, 
“increasing economic interdependence” increases “the expectation of continuity of 
commitment.” Just months before the purchase was announced, China, Japan and South 
Korea signed a trilateral investment agreement to “advance cooperation in nontraditional 
security issues such as piracy, energy security, cybersecurity, communicable diseases, 
terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”105 Unfortunately, 
this diplomatic overture was not enough to forestall rising tensions. 
Continued political overtures attempted to smooth while military actions disrupted 
that economic interdependence.106 Those political and military actions included 
purchasing the islands, collision at sea, or patrolling maritime vessels in the waters. 
Another one of those actions that disrupted economic communication was drilling for the 
“undersea hydrocarbon resources.”107 Literature on the island dispute cites this as one of 
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the major factors preventing further resolution. Recent studies show that the existence of 1 
trillion cubic feet of gas have hardened tensions between the two countries. 
These negative implications had ripple effects to more Japanese businesses in 
China. One instance of negative implications occurred to the Japanese retail store, Aeon, 
at their Qingdao location. In this example, there were 3,000 angry protesters in from of the 
mall after the purchase of the islands was announced.108 The Japanese government 
estimates that damages to the Aeon mall totaled up to 700 million yen, with up to 10 billion 
yen in Japanese business losses.109 These losses and reaction from the Chinese population 
spurred Japanese businesses to reconsider continuing due to the damages. 
The negative effects of political tensions were not limited to just retail sales. 
“[A]nalysts reported a 30 per cent decline in sales for Japanese car brands in 
September.”110 Another business, the Nissan dealership in Qingdao, also suffered, but in 
a different manner. Even though the owner tried to preempt boycott of the store by posting 
a “banner proclaiming Chinese ownership of the islands and backing a ‘resolute boycott of 
Japanese goods’” his company sales still dropped and caused him to seek employment 
elsewhere.111 
Despite the tensions caused by the 2012 incident, economic ties were maintained 
but did not grow. Individual companies were not the only ones that suffered from the 
bilateral fallout. Export and import suffered from the 2012 incident as seen from data 
collected by The Observatory of Economic Complexity. In 2011, China exported US$170 
billion worth in trade to Japan.112 In 2012, that amount jumped an additional US$5 billion 
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to US$175 billion.113 This shows some consistency in China’s exports to Japan, and held 
true to the fact that China was more interested in maintaining economic stability overall. 
The following year, 2013, remains relatively high, but does show a significant change in 
amount exported. China’s total export amount to Japan dropped by US$11 billion, to 
US$164 billion because of increased political tensions.114 That was a decrease of almost 
16% from 2012. In response to that decrease, 2014 export values retuned to US$172 billion, 
comparable with 2011 and 2012.115 But that did not last for long as 2015 saw export values 
sink to US$153 billion.116 
In Japan, exports to China in 2011 were valued at US$164 billion.117 Unlike Japan, 
that number decreased to US$148 billion in 2012.118 Japan’s exports further continued to 
stagnate or fall. Japan only exported US$134 billion to China in 2013.119 And in 2014, 
that number was the same.120 In 2015, export values sunk to US$116 billion.121 Despite 
the decrease in both China and Japan’s exports to the other, at least exports and imports 
continued to occur and remain significant. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Japan’s purchase of the islands in 2012 led to China undertaking a number of 
unprecedented responses, including lodging angry protests, ratcheting up state media 
coverage which featured bellicose commentary, and tolerating for a while the biggest anti-
Japan demonstration marked by violent acts targeting Japanese interests, such as looting 
shops and restaurants, smashing Japanese-made cars, burning buildings of some Japanese 
companies and ransacking some Japanese supermarkets.”122 However, in the end both 
countries delayed conclusion of the dispute with the associated risks of disagreement in 
favor of economic preservation; determination to maintain and develop economic relations 
between China and Japan kept military actions restrained.  
In 2012, while there was a slight increase in military activities compared to previous 
years, each country did not want to increase military friction, since it would have a ripple 
effect on the economic front. Despite the tensions from the 2012 incident, China and 
Japan’s economic ties have been maintained. Although Japan’s exports to China 
diminished over time, those exports remained in place. Although China’s public protested 
and disputed the purchase of the islands, Japanese businesses did what they could to remain 
open. Both countries had to make some concessions to maintain the status quo and avoid 
exacerbating the situation even further. Instead, China and Japan have largely put the island 
issue to the side and focused on maintaining their economic ties. 
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IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter looks at the possible implications of the dispute and the options the 
two countries may pursue. Given the norm that “a state tends to enhance trade with an ally 
while it is reluctant to promote trade with an adversary,”123 economic stability was largely 
the motivational factor between the two countries. But the most significant reason the two 
countries have come to a standstill regarding their policies and overtures is an imbalance 
of power. Each country wants “to improve its security position by creating asymmetries in 
its economic and strategic relationships with” the other.124 And each country will try to 
create that unsteadying imbalance just enough to maintain a strong economy coupled with 
“economic power and political influence.”125 
China and Japan hesitate to change the way they have been approaching the dispute. 
Each assumes it has the upper hand in terms of the strategic relationship with the other. 
Any change in that might upset the status quo. Both countries have been consistently at 
odds with each other. Will the economic overtures help make things better diplomatically 
and militarily or will each see the other as encroaching upon their rightful territory? Which 
is more likely to foment more dangerous activities or popular protests among their people? 
While both countries are dealing with various social issues that affect their economic status, 
neither would be prepared for a pending upset or worst-case scenario of war that could 
ensue. Could China strengthen its position with everyone else in the region without Japan’s 
input? 
The sole cause of conflict over any number of items is the two countries’ differing 
perspectives on the same issue. Each country can see its own side of the coin clearly but 
may have issues looking over to the other side. Fused with that misperception notion from 
the beginning, the strong beliefs of nationalism, specifically military nationalism, have not 
gone unnoticed by both parties. Indeed, in a study done by Han-Yi Shaw in 1999, prior to 
 




this event, the same recommendation was made to “refrain from provocative actions based 
on unquestioned self-righteousness and intolerance of the others’ argument…[to head 
toward] a rational and equitable solution.”126 
In all the possible reactions to each country’s overtures regarding the islands there 
could have been several different outcomes—ranging from the most peaceful to the most 
violent. However, none of these happened as resolution efforts have continually been 
delayed for future deliberation. 
One of the options is outright resolution of the dispute:  to determine which country 
gets what part of the islands or if none have any claim at all. The discussion above has tried 
to parse out the different factors that are barriers to resolution, namely, economic, but also 
nationalism, diplomacy, and military strength. These factors have created images of 
preconceived notions on both sides. With as many varying opinions each country has over 
the years of this dispute, the most neutral option would be to create a no-man’s land of the 
islands, so that neither country has access to it. However, that would take time and money 
and manpower that none of the other countries in the region would be able to support. Of 
all the outcomes, this option would be the most peaceful. 
As previously mentioned, China’s delaying strategy uses minimal but slightly 
increasing amount of force to hold what it has claimed without drawing too much attention 
to the issue. However, when both sides push the issue at what point might China provoke 
a retaliation from Japan? At what point might Japan provoke a retaliation from China? And 
if so, what kind of reaction might occur? The most violent outcome would be war between 
“China and Japan, the two largest economies and largest militaries in Asia….”127 This is 
the most violent and unstable outcome. Although war would generate some economic 
stimulation within each country, it would disrupt the trade routes that are already and 
continuing to be built by both countries. War would cause more problems that it would 
solve. Due to the large volume of trade in the region, economic instability due to war would 
cause a global ripple effect. 
 
126 Shaw, “The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute,” 133.  
127 Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 147. 
43 
Another outcome could involve the development of joint exercises between the two 
countries. This would not be as radical as complete resolution but allow the two militaries 
to work together in such a contested geographic area. On a similar note, “Singapore’s PM 
Lee Hsien Loong urged China and Japan to ‘moderate nationalist sentiment…work toward 
reconciliation…and come to terms with the history of the Second World War the way 
Germany and France have done in Europe.’”128 Only history will tell if Beijing and Tokyo 
can arrive at such an arrangement. 
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